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Using a proprietary dataset of meta-orders and prediction signals, and assuming a quasi-linear
impact model, we deconvolve market impact from past correlated trades and a predictable return
component to elicit the temporal dependence of the market impact of a single daily meta-order,
over a ten day horizon in various equity markets. We find that the impact of single meta-orders
is to a first approximation universal and slowly decays to zero (or to a small value), possibly as a
power-law. We show that auto-correlated order-flows and trade information contents fully accounts
for the apparent plateau observed in the raw data. We discuss the possible bias introduced by the
quasi-linear assumption.
PACS numbers:
INTRODUCTION
One of the most fundamental question in financial eco-
nomics is the shape and nature of price impact, to wit:
how buying (/selling) a quantity Q of shares (or con-
tracts on future markets, or any other traded asset) will
move the price, in particular when this quantity Q is ex-
ecuted incrementally over time [1, 2]. There is now a
remarkable consensus that the impact of such a meta-
order – measured as the average difference between the
final price and the initial price times the sign of the or-
der – has an approximate square-root dependence on Q
(see e.g. [3–10]). More precisely, a very large number of
independent quantitative measures of price impact have
concluded that to a first approximation, and indepen-
dently of the asset class, time period, style of trading
and micro-structure peculiarities, one has (see Fig. 2):〈
 · p(T )− p(0)
p(0)
〉
≈ Y0σ
(
Q
V
)δ
≡ θ, (1)
where  = ±1 for buy (sell) orders, p(0) is the price at
the start of the execution period and p(T ) the price at
the end of the execution period. Here and below, 〈...〉
denote averaging. In the right hand side of the equation,
σ and V are, respectively, the volatility of the traded
instrument and the total traded volume over the order
execution time scale T , Y0 a dimensionless constant of
order unity, and δ is the impact exponent in the range
[0.4, 0.7]. Theoretical models allowing one to understand
the mechanisms underlying this strongly concave, non-
intuitive impact function, have been put forward in [6, 9,
11, 12] (on a related topic, see also [13]).
Still, whereas the description of the contemporaneous
impact of orders in terms of Eq. (1) is by now well ac-
cepted, the fate of this impact after the order has been
completed is still not settled and is a matter of debate. On
general grounds, one expects this impact to relax from its
peak value, since upon conditioning on the fact that the
extra buyer (seller) is no longer active, the subsequent
flow is biased in the opposite direction. This is clearly
the case in the “latent order book” model of To´th et al.
[6, 9], but has also been argued on theoretical grounds in
[11] (see also [14]). Based on fair pricing (no arbitrage)
arguments, the authors of [11] propose that the asymp-
totic value of the impact (long after the order has been
completed) should be a fraction of the peak value, in such
a way that the average price paid by the buyer (seller) is
equal to the long term value. This implies zero average
profit both for the liquidity provider and for the trader.
For a concave impact and a constant rate of execution,
it is easy to derive from Eq. (1) that the average paid
price is θ/(1 + δ) above the initial price p(0). Therefore,
the long-time plateau value of the impact is predicted to
be 2/3 of the peak value when δ = 1/2. This prediction
seems to be borne out by two empirical papers [5, 15],
while a third study [16] reports a more complex picture,
where “informed” trades and “uninformed” trades lead
to a very different impact relaxation pattern. In the for-
mer case, the impact seems to relax towards the predicted
2/3 value, while in the latter case, impact appears to re-
lax all the way to zero. The authors of [16] argue that
uninformed trades should have no long term impact, and
that the long-term impact of informed trades should re-
flect, on average, the information content of these trades.
Incidentally, both papers [15, 16] confirm once again the
validity of square-root impact law, Eq. (1).
While we agree with the general ideas expressed in
[16], there are several issues that need to be clarified.
First, from a theoretical point of view – if some trades
are uninformed and others are informed, the simple fair
pricing argument of [11] becomes more subtle since liq-
uidity providers can make money out of “noise traders”,
as in Kyle’s model [1]. Second, as recognized in [16],
the notion of informed trades is at best ambiguous and
needs to be supplemented by a time horizon, over which
the prediction is supposed to be realized. If buying a
stock is with the objective of very short-term gains, on
the same scale as the measurement of impact relaxation,
then the distinction between informed and uninformed
trades may be warranted. But if the future gain is over
ar
X
iv
:1
40
7.
33
90
v1
  [
q-
fin
.T
R]
  1
2 J
ul 
20
14
2several months while impact is measured over a few hours
to a few days (beyond which the noise level becomes in-
superable), then clearly the distinction is moot. Third,
and perhaps most importantly, there is a methodologi-
cal problem with the way the data has been analyzed in
all previous work on the subject. The point is that pro-
prietary order flows tend to be highly auto-correlated in
time (due to the slicing of large buy/sell orders over sev-
eral days or sometimes weeks). Price dynamics seen after
completion of an intra-day meta-order therefore reflects
both its own decaying impact and the impact dynam-
ics from all previous orders as well. This requires some
deconvolution treatment that turns out to be crucial to
properly address the question of impact decay – as the
empirical and theoretical analysis below clearly demon-
strates.
In this Letter, we analyze the impact of CFM’s propri-
etary trades on equity markets. We show that our data
is, after deconvolution, compatible with a price model
where the “mechanical” impact of meta-orders decays
all the way to zero, superimposed with some (investor
dependent) predictability pattern. In other words, we
posit that the average price profile after the completion,
at time t, of a single meta-order, of volume Q and pre-
dictability α, is the sum of two fundamentally different
contributions:
Et[p(t > T )] ≈ p(0)
[
1 + θ(Q)I(t− T ) + αH(t)]. (2)
In the above equation, θ(Q) ≡ (Q)Y0σ [Q/V ]δ is the in-
stantaneous impact of the trade, I(τ) is a “propagator”
describing the mechanical part of the impact [17], which
decreases from I(0) = 1 to I(∞) ≈ 0. The predictor am-
plitude α (possibly equal to zero for uninformed trades)
is the expected long term price profile that motivated
the trade at time t = 0 and H(t) describes the way this
prediction realizes itself over time. For example, for an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck predictor, H(t) = 1 − exp(−Γt) for
a prediction on a horizon ∼ Γ−1 (see below). For unin-
formed trades or for bets on very long horizons such that
Γt  1, one can set α = 0. This, we believe, allows one
to stitch together various aspects of the literature in a
coherent way. However, as we shall argue in the conclu-
sion, the model defined by Eq. (2) is not entirely satis-
factory, since it is quasi-linear (different meta-orders add
up linearly) whereas the concavity of each single meta-
order [Eq. (1)] indicates strong non additive behaviour,
at least on short time scales.
AN ILLUSTRATIVE TOY-MODEL
Let us first present a toy-model that highlights the dif-
ference between the “true” impact I(τ) and the impact
of a sequence of correlated trades, resulting from an in-
vestor who attempts to optimize his gains. We consider
an idealized market where impact is linear and decays
instantaneously, i.e. the true impact is I(τ) = γδ(τ).
We imagine that the investor has an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
signal s(t) with correlation time Γ−1, such that:
〈s(τ)s(0)〉 = e−Γ|τ |. (3)
The prediction based on this signal is that the price
change between t and t+ dt is:
〈pd(t+ dt)− pd(t)|s(t)〉 = Gs(t)dt, (4)
while the integrated expected gain up to time t+ τ is:
〈pd(t+ τ)− pd(t)|s(t)〉 = s(t)G
Γ
[1− exp(−Γτ)] . (5)
The investor wants to optimise the total gain, impact
costs included, for a fixed level of risk R2. This is im-
plemented (in continuous time) as the maximisation of:
L = 1
T
[∫ T
0
dtpi(t)Gs(t)− γ
2
∫ T
0
dtp˙i(t)2 − λ
∫ T
0
dtpi(t)2
]
(6)
where pi(t) is the position (in $) at time t and γ is the
impact coefficient: trading at speed p˙i pushes the price
instantaneously by an amount γp˙i. The average price
paid in the process is 12γp˙i. λ is the Lagrange multiplier
allowing one to fix the average risk at a chosen value R2.
We assume that T →∞ in the following and forget about
the bounds on t.
The above quadratic optimisation problem can easily
be solved, see e.g. [18, 19]. The solution of this problem
is to fix the position pi(t) proportional to an exponential
moving average of the predictor:
pi(t) = φ0
∫ t
−∞
dt′e−ω(t−t
′)s(t′), φ0 =
G
γ(ω + Γ)
(7)
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FIG. 1: Illustration of the difference between the “true” im-
pact I(τ) of an isolated order (here chosen to be a δ-function
in time) and the apparent impact Iraw(τ) of a series of cor-
related trades, resulting from optimizing the expected gain
of a strategy based on an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck predictor, with
Γ = 0.1 and z = 0.5.
3where the averaging frequency ω is set by the following
equation:
z(1 + z)3 =
σ2G2
γ2R2Γ4
; ω = zΓ. (8)
As expected, z → ∞ when γ → 0, i.e. the position
tracks instantaneously the signal. As the friction be-
comes higher however, the signal has to be slowed down
in order to extract a positive gain from the signal.
Now, we want to compute the measured impact induced
by this optimal trading policy. More precisely, we will de-
fine the “raw” impact Iraw(τ), normalized by the average
price impact due to trading at the end of the first trad-
ing period (i.e. at t + dt, just before the “true” impact
decays back to zero), as:
〈(pd(t+τ)−pd(t))p˙i(t)〉 = γ〈p˙i(t)2〉×Iraw(τ), (τ > 0).
(9)
This is the impact one would measure by averaging the
average price profile over all the trades of the investor,
without any deconvolution (hence the term “raw”). It is
easy to show that:
〈(pd(t+ τ)− pd(t))p˙i(t)〉 = γφ20 [1− exp(−Γτ)] (10)
which has to be normalized by:
γ〈p˙i(t)2〉 = 1
(z + 1)
γφ20, (11)
finally leading to (see Fig. 1):
Iraw(τ) = (1 + z) [1− exp(−Γτ)] . (12)
This calculation reveals that although I(τ) is a δ-function
in time, Iraw(τ) increases from zero to a non universal
plateau value 1+z which depends continuously on the a-
dimensional variable γRΓ2/σG that measures the relative
strength of the impact costs and the expected gains [25].
EMPIRICAL DATA AND IMPACT DECAY
The above toy-model clearly shows that in order to
measure the “true impact” I(τ), a careful deconvolu-
tion of the raw impact must be performed. Our em-
pirical analysis is based on a proprietary CFM dataset,
consisting in the exhaustive list of 1.6 million meta-
orders, together with the daily signals that lead to these
trades, over three full years (2011-2013) in a variety
of equity markets (Europe, US, Japan and Australia).
In this dataset, each transaction derives from a daily
trading decision, resulting in a sequence of daily meta-
orders of signed quantities {q(0), q(1), . . . , q(t), q(t +
1), . . .} (where q(t) := (t)Q(t)), starting at decision
(midpoint) prices {pd(0), pd(1), . . . , pd(t), pd(t + 1), . . .}
and executed over the course of the day at average
prices {px(0), px(1), . . . , px(t), px(t+1), . . .}. Typical vol-
ume fractions are in the range Q/V ∼ 0.1 − 5% (see
Fig. 2). Note that orders, when started, are always
(nearly) fully executed, with average execution rate ex-
ceeding 99%. There is therefore no selection bias in
the execution price of our trades. The daily signals
{pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(t), pi(t + 1), . . .} correspond to CFM’s
best prediction of future prices, and are a combination
of a variety of medium to long term technical and fun-
damental indicators, and with a prediction horizon Γ−1
ranging from 10 to 100 days. The signals pi(t) are com-
puted just before the execution of the meta-order and
are normalized to have unit variance. The signals are
furthermore made market neutral so all results reported
below are, to first order, immune to market directional
effects.
Due to price impact, the execution prices px(t) are on
average higher (lower) than the initial market midpoint
pd(t) when the buy (sell) meta-order started, causing
both the “strike slippage” rx(t) = (px(t) − pd(t))/pd(t)
and the price change rd(t) = (pd(t+1)−pd(t))/pd(t) be-
tween two daily trading decisions to exhibit the expected
square-root dependence on Q/V (see Fig. 2, where the
fitting line corresponds to δ = 0.6), in agreement with
Eq. (1) and well in line with all previous research, see in
particular [4].
We now turn to measuring the decay of impact over
subsequent days. We first determine the raw average
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FIG. 2: Impact as a function of the volume fraction |q|/V of
traded meta-orders on equity markets. The line is a moving
average through a cloud of points corresponding to individual
meta-orders (not shown). The dependence is concave and
follows a power-law scaling of exponent δ = 0.6 over the whole
range of |q|/V . This value of δ turns out to be exactly the
same as the one obtained by Almgren et al. [4].
4impact Iraw(τ) through the following regression:
pd(t+ τ)− pd(t)
pd(t)
= Iraw(τ)θ(t) + ξ(t), (13)
where ξ is a noise term, and again θ(t) ≡
Y0(t)σ[Q(t)/V ]
δ. Note that by definition, Iraw(τ) is
normalized to unity for τ = 1−, i.e. at the end of the
meta-order of the first day (as for our toy model above).
We also define, in the same units, the average cost Ix
incurred by our execution, as caused by the impact of
this order on px(t) and any other micro-structural ef-
fects: rx(t) = Ixθ(t). The result of the regression Eq.
(13) averaged over all markets and all periods is shown
as the roughly constant black line in Fig. 3-a. Note
that in this graph we have divided Iraw(τ) by Ix, in such
a way that “fair pricing” should yield a horizontal line
y = 1. One sees that, in apparent agreement with the
fair-price argument, the (rescaled) price indeed remains
in the vicinity of the executed price Ix several days after
the initial meta-order was completed .
However, the autocorrelation 〈(t)(t+ τ)〉 of the sign
of the trades is found significantly positive over several
days, obfuscating, as illustrated by our toy-model above,
how much of the raw dynamics Iraw(τ) actually reflects
the impact of a single meta-order. In other words, the
impact of the trades following the initial one keeps the
impact Iraw(τ) artificially high. Furthermore, since the
trades are initiated in part by predictive signals, one
should expect this signal to reveal itself through time
and contribute to Iraw(τ).
Instead of temporally aggregating successive meta-
orders of the same sign as in [15, 16] (a non-causal proce-
dure which, as such, induces conditioning artefacts), or
using a somewhat ad-hoc correction to compensate for
the trades occurring during the decay of impact [16], we
propose to deconvolve jointly past trades and predictions
from the raw impact dynamics assuming a quasi-linear
model, i.e. linearly regressing the daily returns rd(t) on
both past impacts {θ(t), θ(t− 1), . . .} and return predic-
tions {pi(t), pi(t−1), . . .}, exploiting the ability of multiple
least-square regression to properly account for all corre-
lations among regressors:
rd(t) =
t∑
t′=t−M
Gθ(t−t′)θ(t′)+
t∑
t′=t−M
Gpi(t−t′)pi(t′)+ξ(t),
(14)
where M is a certain maximum lag that does not affect
much our conclusions provided it is taken to be larger
than 5 days. In fact, Gpi(t − t′) is found to be close
to Gpi(0)δt,t′ , as expected if the predictor is itself opti-
mal. Instrumental aspects to successfully derive the ker-
nels G(τ) include i) working on a complete set of propri-
etary trades – given the potential of incomplete datasets
to exhibit detrimental bias in the trade autocorrelation
estimation - and ii) performing the linear regression on
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FIG. 3: Impact dynamics, obtained through the regression
Eq. (13), averaged over all trades, markets and periods with
an equal weight, normalized by the execution price Ix. The
shaded region corresponds to 2-σ error bars. The lag is
counted in business days. a) Raw impact appears to reach
a plateau for the raw data (black line) but true impact is
found to be decaying (blue/red lines) once returns are cor-
rected from the influence of past trades and predictability.
The price reverts to its pre-trade value, or at least well be-
low the average the execution price (horizontal dotted line at
y = 1). b) Impact deconvolved profiles for δ = 0.6 (green) and
δ = 1 (blue), and simple power-law fit, yielding I(τ) ∝ τ−0.8.
c) Impact decay profiles as measured over two disjoint time
periods.
market zones separately to ensure maximal homogeneity
within the dataset - as required in any basic least-square
deconvolution.
From the determination of Gθ(τ), the “true” impact
kernel I(τ) (stripped out of the contribution of both pre-
dictions and correlated trades) can be reconstructed as
I(τ) =
∑τ
t′=0Gθ(t
′). The average returns during meta-
order execution rx(t) are treated similarly to compute
5the corresponding {Gθ,x(t′)}t′∈[0,M ], with Gθ,x(0) pro-
viding an execution price proxy itself deconvolved from
past trades and predictions.
Figure 3-a illustrates the result of this approach to de-
convolve Iraw from either past trades only (i.e. enforcing
Gpi(t) ≡ 0 in Eq. 14), or both past trades and predictors.
One can see from Fig. 3-a that the main effect in fact
comes the correlation of meta-orders, which, when taken
into account, leads to a significant decay of I(τ), much
below the execution price Ix (blue line). Removing the
prediction signal decreases further the impact, which de-
cays to a very small value beyond 10 days or so (red line).
The difference between the red and the blue line is how-
ever small, meaning that the average prediction strength
of the signal pi(t) is small on short term horizons (in line
with the fact that Γ−1 ∼ 10− 100 days). The decay pro-
files are also independent on the exact value of the impact
exponent δ that is used to define θ(t). Fig. 3-b shows
that the decay profile remains essentially unchanged for
δ ranging from 0.5 (square root impact) to 1 (linear im-
pact) – providing strong evidence that the observed decay
of I(τ) is a genuine property of impact dynamics rather
than a deconvolution artefact. A simple power-law fit
suggests a slow decay I(τ) ∼ τ−0.8, similar to the decay
of impact of individual trades, see [17, 20]. Deconvolved
profiles appear reasonably stable both in time (Fig. 3-c)
and across equity markets (Fig. 4). Other minor vari-
ations are due to, e.g., unresolved seasonality patterns
less amenable to our multiple least-square regression ap-
proach.
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
The strong divergence between raw and deconvolved
impact decay profiles shown in Fig. 3-a highlights the
subtle interplay between trades, their information con-
tent and price dynamics. Once past trades and pre-
dictable returns are removed, our results suggest that
i) the price dynamics can be decomposed into a “me-
chanical” impact, identical for all trades (as expected on
anonymous markets) and an information part; ii) the me-
chanical impact I(τ) of an isolated meta-order appears to
be fully transient and decays all the way to zero (Fig.3-
a,b) [22]. We therefore believe that the previously re-
ported asymptotic non-zero components are likely to be
caused by the impossibility to adequately subtract these
components from the data – echoing previous research
[16]. Since our results on different time periods and mar-
kets are consistent (within error-bars) with a complete
decay, the relevance of the simple fair-price argument
proposed in [11] is not clear to us (as also highlighted
by our toy-model above).
There are still a number of open questions that future
research, both theoretical and empirical, should try to
address. In particular, our approach explicitly assumes
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FIG. 4: Impact dynamics for different equity markets (here
EU, US, Australia & Japan), once deconvolved of the influ-
ence of past trades (red) and predictability (blue), and nor-
malized by the average execution price Ix.
impact decay to be a quasi-linear time-invariant process
(Eq. (14)), which is in fact Gatheral’s model in discrete
time [24] (see also [17]). This is a seemingly plausible as-
sumption given the consistency of the results presented
so far, but in contradiction with the square-root law it-
self, which suggests that impact is not additive. We have
seen in our data set hints that our linear assumption is
indeed not fully satisfactory. For example, the impact
decay I(τ) measured on the sub-sample of trades that
correspond to the top-half participation rate over the last
ten days is noticeably different from the one measured on
the bottom half (the former decaying faster than the lat-
ter). This of course should not be the case within the
above quasi-linear description. Furthermore, concavity
and time decay are not easy to disentangle. For exam-
ple, if aggregated meta-orders were still in the concave
square-root regime over five days, this would lead to an
apparent decay of ≈ 60% of impact when fitted by a
quasi-linear model, even if impact was fully permanent
[21]. We have however checked that our results are essen-
tially unchanged when regrouping two successive days in
6a new elementary time unit and redoing the above anal-
ysis, suggesting that time decay indeed dominates over
persistent concavity for τ > 1 day. Still, the correct way
to marry the time dependency of impact with its intrinsi-
cally non-linear nature is not trivial and should be better
understood in order to reach a final conclusion. From a
theoretical point of view, investigating further latent liq-
uidity models [6, 9] may allow one to go beyond the above
quasi-linear framework.
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